The roots and constructs of Ibn Khaldūn’s critical thinking by Machouche, Salah & Bensaid, Benaouda
Intellectual Discourse, 23:2 (2015) 201-228
Copyright © IIUM Press 
ISSN 0128-4878 (Print); ISSN 2289-5639 (Online)
The roots and constructs of Ibn Khaldūn’s 
critical thinking
Salah Machouche* and Benaouda Bensaid**
Abstract: Many current researches have sought to explore the thought and 
contributions of Ibn Khaldūn to the various disciplines of human knowledge 
including philosophy of history, historiography, politics, economics, and 
education. Little interest, however, is given to his contributions to the theory 
of critical thinking. This research investigates Ibn Khaldūn’s perspective on 
critical thinking and critique of intellectual disciplines while exploring its 
origin and dimensions. The research shows that Ibn Khaldūn’s critical thinking 
is essentially entrenched in the fundamental vision and origins of Islam, and 
reflective of the broad Islamic scholarship and the practices of Muslim scholars 
across the different religious and rational disciplines. What characterises Ibn 
Khaldūn’s contribution to the field of critical thinking is his ability to apply it 
across various fields of scholarship yet with a conscious attention to society’s 
dynamics, particularly the practical dimensions and implications of his theory 
of human society (‘umrān basharī).
Keywords: Critical thinking; Ibn Khaldūn; muqaddimah; ‘umrān; Islamic 
rationality.
Abstrak: Terdapat banyak kajian terkini yang telah mendalami pemikiran 
dan sumbangan Ibn Khaldūn yang menjangkaui pelbagai bidang pengajian 
kemanusiaan termasuklah falsafah sejarah, pensejarahan, politik, ekonomi, 
dan pendidikan. Walau bagaimanapun, minat yang rendah turut dilihat dalam 
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sumbangan beliau terhadap teori pemikiran manusia. Kajian ini menyiasat 
perspektif Ibn Khaldūn terhadap pemikiran kritis dan kritikan bidang intelek 
selain mengkaji asal usul serta dimensi pemikiran kritis yang telah diajukan 
oleh Ibn Khaldūn. Kajian ini mengumpul penulisan Ibn Khaldūn selain 
daripada kajian-kajian lain yang sejagat, terutamanya  tulisan-tulisan yang 
menitikberatkan pemikiran Ibn Khaldūn serta implikasi epistenologinya. 
Kajian ini menunjukkan bahawa pemikiran kritis Ibn Khaldūn diperlukan 
dalam pembentukan asas visi serta asal usul Islam itu sendiri. Lagipun, ia 
mencerminkan kesarjanaan Islam yang luas serta amalan-amalan pemikir 
Muslim melampaui pelbagai agama dan bidang yang rasional. Apakah sifat-
sifat sumbangan Ibn Khaldūn terhadap bidang pemikiran kritikal, selain 
daripada kebolehannya untuk menggunakannya kesarjanaannya dalam berbagai 
bidang. Namun begitu tumpuan yang nyata terhadap dinamik kemasyarakatan, 
disamping dimensi praktikal serta implikasi teorinya terhadap kemasyarakatan 
(umrān basharī) dilaksanakan.
Kata Kunci: Pemikiran kritis; Ibn Khaldūn; Muqaddimah; ‘umrān; rasionaliti 
Islam.
Over the course of more than six centuries, extensive studies have 
sought to explain, criticise, and interpret Ibn Khaldūn’s (d. 808/1406) 
thought and works. For example, the works of Taha Hussein (1925), M. 
Kamil Ayad (1930), H. A. R. Gibb (1933), Abū Khaldūn Sāṭi‘ al-Ḥuṣrī 
(1967), Muhsin Mahdi (1957), Nassif Nassar (1967), and Mahmoud 
Dhaouadi (2005) have explored the roots of Ibn Khaldūn’s thought from 
different perspectives. They addressed different topics and issues that 
may conveniently be placed beneath the contemporary broad themes of 
politics, economics, history, education, literature, and language. In those 
studies however, different approaches have been used, including but 
not limited to those of orientalists, secularists, positivists, nationalists, 
and so forth. Because of the repetitive and seemingly uniformed type 
of questions often raised, contemporary studies on Ibn Khaldūn seem 
to have hit a glass ceiling or a point of redundant saturation, if not 
stagnation. 
To avoid this destiny, and to move forward with studies of Ibn 
Khaldūn’s works, new questions need to be raised, alongside novel 
approaches, methodologies, objectives, and fields of inquiry; all 
needing to be generated in the light of current branches and conditions 
of learning. Such a shift is critical to the effective shaping of Khaldūnian 
studies, and would be immensely helpful to the understanding, 
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repositioning, and relevantizing of Ibn Khaldūn’s methodology in an 
ever-changing environment of human association/civilisation (‘umrān 
basharī). It is with this in mind that the current study seeks to explore 
the question of critical thinking according to Ibn Khaldūn, which to a 
great extent highlights the Islamic worldview, modes of thinking and 
human experience, equally responsible for giving birth to the science of 
civilisation (‘umrān).
One must, however, acknowledge the challenges associated with re-
visiting the diverse intellectual contributions of Ibn Khaldūn in the light 
of a new perspective, as the original text of his work is nonetheless still 
resourceful. One also needs to retain a constant awareness of the extent 
to which Ibn Khaldūn’s thought is embedded in an intricate framework 
of the Islamic worldview, personal practice, socio-historical experience, 
taxonomy of knowledge, and certainly not to forget about his particular 
technical language. 
General background of critical thinking
Critical thinking is defined as the use of cognitive skills or strategies 
which increase the probability of desirable outcomes (Halpern, 1996). 
Critical thinking denotes thinking that is purposeful, reasoned, and goal 
directed; a form of thinking involved in solving problems, formulating 
inferences, calculating likelihoods, and making decisions when 
employing skills that are thoughtful and effective for the particular 
context of thinking. Critical thinking also denotes the formation of 
logical inferences (Simon & Kaplan, 1989), a development of cohesive 
and logical reasoning patterns (Stall & Stahl, 1991), and the careful 
and deliberate determination of whether to accept, reject, or suspend 
judgments. These definitions capture the general idea of a mental 
activity that is useful and instrumental for a particular cognitive task 
Although not regarded as an independent discipline in the history 
of Islamic thought (Solihu, 2010-2011), critical thinking has expressed 
itself through individual and collective scholarship practices, the use 
of cognitive skills, strategies, and thought processes having unique 
specifications that belong to particular religious and civilisational 
origins. In order to ensure the criticality of the intellectual exercise, 
the Islamic literature contains forms of cognitive thought operations, 
such as examination (taḥqīq), critic (naqd), review (tahdhīb), critical 
evaluation of narrators or (impugnment), (tajrīḥ al-ruwāt), simplifying/
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approximation (taqrīb), justification (ta‘līl), refutation (radd), and 
validation of the cause in new cases (tanqīḥ al-manāṭ). Procedures of 
critical thinking are commonplace amidst branches of Islamic studies, 
including Qur’ānic exegesis, the science of ḥadīth, scholastic theology, 
and history. 
Disciplines of Islamic sciences apply customised apparatus of 
demonstrations as is the case with juristic inferences made of religious 
texts and leading to formulation of principles and maxims, or treatment of 
juristic cases and further building of legal apparatus, extract the decisive 
cause (‘illah mu’aththirah) through established steps of extraction 
(istikhrāj), investigating (imtiḥān), inferences (istintāj) or determination 
of the original reason/cause. In the field of Islamic jurisprudence, one 
also finds extensive usage of contrasting and weighing of legal/juristic 
evidences (ta‘āruḍ wa-tarjīḥ al-adillah). Those strategies pertain to 
linguistics, prophetic traditions, and fundamental rules. 
Ibn Khaldūn’s perspective of critical thinking reflects serious 
dedication to protect the essence and originality of Islamic thought. 
For instance, he discloses the undesirable impact of Greek logic on the 
development of sciences. In his survey of the historical development 
of Islamic knowledge, whether related to revelation, nature, or ‘umrān, 
Ibn Khaldūn sought to demonstrate the detrimental influences of foreign 
ideas and sciences on Islamic disciplines, particularly on Muslim 
speculative theology and mysticism. 
Roots of Ibn Khaldūn’s critical thinking
To a large extent researchers have sought to identify the intellectual 
origins of Ibn Khaldūn. While coming up with various interpretations, 
each set accords to a specific approach of inquiry, including that of 
the French colonials, as is the case with early French translators of 
the Muqaddimah. In addition to the known orientalists, such as Gibb, 
Arab apologists and semi-utilitarian writers produced early studies on 
Ibn Khaldūn. Those approaches generally sought to accommodate the 
contributions and epistemic methodology of Ibn Khaldūn within their 
own intellectual circles and interpretations, their respective worldviews, 
methodologies, and objectives, as well as their historical and cultural 
experiences. Generally speaking, those intellectual models have hardly 
escaped subjectivism, partiality, and even bias. The thought of Ibn 
Khaldūn has in fact been re-interpreted instead of being explained, and 
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has been depicted as isolated fragments of thought rather than being 
introduced as an organic intellectual thesis.
One of the most subjective endeavours of note perhaps relates to the 
attempt to employ every possible methodological tool to deracinate Ibn 
Khaldūn’s thought from its original intellectual cradle. Perhaps the best 
example of this category of studies are those which assign some sort of 
secular identity to his thought, including Muhsin Mahdi (1957), Wardī 
(1994), and Baali and Wardī (1981). In fact, biased treatment of the 
thought of Ibn Khaldūn might have caused the stagnancy of his thought 
today, which is understood in view of the fact that his thought requires 
rather native, original, and genuine context of interpretation. 
Ibn Khaldūn’s works and thought have also been notably compared 
to classical and modern eminent Western figures and thinkers, such as the 
Greek historian Thucydides (Goodman, 1972), Machiavelli, Giovanni 
Battista Vico, Montesquieu, Adam Smith, August Comte, Ludwig 
Gumplowicz, Karl Marx, Emile Durkheim (Baali & Wardi, 1981), Max 
Weber (Ardıẓ, 2008), and Arnold Toynbee (Irwin, (1997). Some sought 
to examine the nature and styles of thinking according to Ibn Khaldūn, 
as with Muhsin Mahdi who attempted to study “the science of culture” 
(‘ilm al-‘umrān), further examining Ibn Khaldūn’s early dual-education, 
including both Ibn Khaldūn’s religious education under Abū Muhammad 
ibn ‘Abd al-Muhaymin al-Ḥaḍramī and his philosophical education 
under ‘Abdullāh Muhammad al-Abilly (Mahdi, 1957). 
Muhsin Mahdi for instance studied the impact of legal Mālikī 
thought on the thinking of Ibn Khaldūn, and on his understanding 
of the association existing between revelation and reason and their 
implications for the study of society. The idea is that the Mālikī 
School of law depends on the living tradition of Medina (‘amal ahl 
al-Madīnah) to tackle and evaluate the diverse yet practical problems 
of the social order, and the order of doing in the Muslim community 
(Mahdi, 1957). Mahdi notes Ibn Khaldūn’s preference for philosophy, 
as opposed to dialectical theology (‘ilm al-kalām) as was the case with 
many later scholars (Mahdi, 1957, p. 35). He further argues that Ibn 
Khaldūn’s thinking style should be explained according to his training 
in philosophical sciences. For him, “…his [Ibn Khaldūn] early training 
in philosophical sciences had taught him that the understanding of a 
subject requires an investigation that progresses from the external data, 
transmitted from the past or acquired through personal experience, to 
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the explanatory and demonstrable knowledge of their cause and nature” 
(Mahdi, 1957, p. 48).
Along similar lines, Nasif Nassar conducted his study on Ibn 
Khaldūn’s thinking or “La Pensée”. In the first chapter of his work 
entitled ‘Critique de La Raison Speculative’, Nassar explains the 
fundamentals and directions of Ibn Khaldūn’s thinking using a 
philosophical perspective. He also stresses that Ibn Khaldūn’s mode 
of critical thinking cannot be compared to some other common styles 
known among European philosophers, such as Cartesian rationality, 
Kantian criticism, or Hegelian idealism. These modes of critical 
thinking, Nassar further argues, “…have nothing in common with Ibn 
Khaldūn’s thought” (Nassar, p. 46). In a similar spirit, Baali and Wardī 
(1981, p. vii) explored Ibn Khaldūn’s thinking styles in an attempt 
to “construct Ibn Khaldūn’s frame of reference” and to demonstrate 
that the Khaldūnian theory conveniently fits into the contemporary 
sociology of today. Both described Ibn Khaldūn’s thought as “realistic” 
and both agree that Ibn Khaldūn sought to develop ‘a realistic kind 
of logic to replace the old idealistic one’ which, they labelled as 
temporalistic-relativistic-materialistic logic (Baali & Wardī, 1981, pp. 
77-78). According to Dhaouadi (2005), the three determinants of the 
great Khaldūnian mind include broad knowledge, a stimulating external 
milieu, and special humanity traits.
On the other hand, a number of Arab researchers sought to use 
conflicting views in their explanation of the relationship between Ibn 
Khaldūn’s thought and his own faith and religion. Baali’s (1988, p. 6) 
following statement illustrates the point: “Ibn Khaldūn can be highly 
considered the Islamic version of Machiavelli,” for the reason that 
“both Ibn Khaldūn and Machiavelli distinguished themselves from 
their scholastic contemporaries by treating social affairs within a highly 
realistic frame of reference.” A significant difference does distinguish 
them from one another however, “…Machiavelli rejects idealism for 
realism, Ibn Khaldūn acknowledges the validity and importance of 
both.” Moreover, “Ibn Khaldūn, unlike Machiavelli, does not belittle 
the significance of the ideal and religious…the thing he [Ibn Khaldūn] 
dislikes most in this respect is the interference of religious idealism in 
the actual affairs of life” (Baali & Wardī, 1981, p. 21). He shows that 
the ‘religious’ is placed with ‘ideal’, and both–as they are attributed to 
Ibn Khaldūn–should not interfere with the actual affairs of life. One 
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may question however, as to how can someone acknowledge Islam as 
religion (way of life) and at the same time exclude its role from shaping 
people’s lives. This sort of reasoning only adds confusion and distortion 
on the relationship between religion and human life in Ibn Khaldūn’s 
thought.
The study of criticism current in Ibn Khaldūn thought only weakens 
the position of those scholars who view him as a pupil of Aristotle, one 
who based himself on philosophy and Greek logic. Until today, many 
continue to believe that the thought of Ibn Khaldūn is nothing less than 
a continuity of this philosophical way of thinking, an understanding of 
the world of man by means of extended Aristotelian logic. Dale (2006), 
for instance, argues that the Khaldūnian philosophical roots are identical 
with those of the French scholars and Western sociologists, as many 
Islamists have intuited but not explained. Ibn Khaldūn did not forget 
these principles; he did not fully appreciate them. For him, these roots 
are Aristotelian logic and Greek environmental determinism in essence. 
This first imbued him with a desire to understand, and the necessary 
intellectual tools to interpret historical change, whereas the second 
provided him with axiomatic truths regarding human society.
To move forward and to avoid an old yet biased reading, Khaldūnian 
studies need to be raised to higher standards of objectivity, and his 
Muqaddimah should be given the right to speak for itself by virtue of its 
substance, rather than through inferred associations. In fact, approaches 
that are materialistic, secular, or reductionist in nature have only tampered 
the originality of Ibn Khaldūn’s work and thought. They have failed to 
appreciate any of Ibn Khaldūn’s originality or intellectual criticality. In 
essence, they have lost sight of the most critical worldview of Tawḥid 
which poses itself as a quintessential modus operandi for Ibn Khaldūn’s 
reasoning. For Ibn Khaldūn, Tawḥīd represented the prime filter through 
which all undesirably foreign intellectual infiltrations were checked and 
parsed. And unlike the Aristotelian logic which is built on a foreign 
Greek worldview, religious beliefs, theory of knowledge, epistemology, 
socio-cultural experience, and language, the present dominance and 
effects of Tawḥīd on Ibn Khaldūn’s thought makes it difficult for foreign 
ideas, thoughts, interpretations, perceptions, and theories to survive. 
The Muqaddimah demonstrates Ibn Khaldūn’s thinking patterns on 
human society and organisation. Ibn Khaldūn refers to such innate or 
native reasoning as tafkīr ṭabī‘ī, burhān ṭabī‘ī (natural thinking) which 
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Rosenthal translated as the natural means for the perception of the 
truth (Ibn Khaldūn, 1967, p. 420). It was Ibn Khaldūn’s distinct line of 
thinking that sets him apart from his fellow scholars like ‘Abdullah ibn 
al-Muqaffa‘ (d. 756) and Abū Bakr al-Ṭurṭūshī (d. 1126). Ibn Khaldūn 
(1967) openly declares that his work is a divine gift, instead of being 
a result of the instruction of Aristotle or teachings of Mobedhan. The 
reader of the Muqaddimah quickly realises that the most critical yet 
Qur’ānically inferred concepts that define the Khaldūnian perspective 
are ‘imrān, ‘aṣabiyyah, fiṭrah, and sunnat Allāh. In spite of this, 
however, Dale (2006), among others, suggests reading the work of 
Ibn Khaldūn through the adoption of the “conceptual language” of 
Muslim philosophers. For him, the Muqaddimah needs to be read 
with a philosophical glossary such as al-Fārābī’s Lexicon, as many of 
Ibn Khaldūn’s terms carry multiple meanings, and the philosophical 
import of his vocabulary cannot be easily deciphered with the common 
dictionary.
Understanding the origins of Ibn Khaldūn’s critical thinking is 
possible with an appreciation of the context of his thought, including for 
example his learning, education, contributions, and a lifelong journey 
of many critical stages. His early madrasah education, his revelatory 
framework, Islamic sciences, the ‘umrān life of Muslims in both the 
East and the West, personal experiences and traits, and the many socio-
political changes he endured throughout are to be seriously integrated 
in the process of analysis as keys to a holistic understanding of Ibn 
Khaldūn’s critical thinking. In the following section, we will highlight 
some of these serious keys of analysis.
The impact of religious education 
Ibn Khaldūn’s early traditional training opened his eyes to the highest 
sources of Islamic knowledge, including the use of the model of juristic 
problems (al-masā’il) and various other disciplines of traditional/
transmitted knowledge. Those provided Ibn Khaldūn with the 
opportunity to train his cognitive faculties, and in this manner hone his 
intellectual and cognitive skills. Methods and styles of thinking such as 
the sharpening of mind and memory (taqwiyat al-dhākīrah wa-shaḥdh 
al-dhihn), methods of demonstration (istidlāl), deduction (istinbāṭ), 
induction (istiqrā’), analogy (qiyās), verification (taḥqīq), refutation 
(daḥḍ), testing (imtiḥān), observation (mushāhadah), dialect (jadal), 
description (waṣf), critique (naqd), and comparison (muqāranah), all 
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contributed to the building of his system of religious scholarship and 
general intellectual make up. They provided Ibn Khaldūn with an order 
of reasoning that helped him apply religious learning to society, history, 
culture, economy, politics, and emerging life changes. 
For Ibn Khaldūn, the application of the Islamic sciences should 
not be restricted to developing abstract knowledge; rather, it should be 
concerned with life, the state, exploration, and evaluation of practical 
cases. To show the position of practical knowledge, Ibn Khaldūn uses 
the example of a person who realises in theory the religious virtue and 
merit of showing mercy to orphans versus another who practices that 
knowledge and as a result achieves spiritual states (aḥwāl) and acquires 
its attribute (ittiṣāf) (Ibn Khaldūn, 1967). Those descriptions helped him 
move vertically, exposing the facts of his social reality in an attempt 
to observe and understand the true manifestations and reflections of 
human association (‘imrān).
Prior to his socio-political exposure, Ibn Khaldūn had already been 
immersed in the learning and memorisation of Revelation at a strikingly 
young age. It was there, at an early age, when he acquired familiarity 
with various types of thinking and demonstrations. Among the important 
Qur’ānic lessons Ibn Khaldūn learned is the necessity of demonstration 
in human knowledge. In the Qur’ān, the term burhān is cited on eight 
different occasions and used with reference to different methods of valid, 
sound, and truthful demonstration. Revelation exhorts believers to use 
coining parables and verifying events. The relevance of Ibn Khaldūn 
may be explained with respect to his use of revelation throughout the 
process of thought and study of human conditions. Numerous evidences 
substantiate this hypothesis, including the effect of his worldview of 
Tawḥīd on all of his ideas, particularly the discussion of the nature of 
human association, the use of Qur’ānic terminology, style of explaining 
laws, and citation of Qur’ānic verses and ḥadīth reports to support and 
substantiate his views.
The accessible knowledge
To a larger degree, critical thinking depends on both quantity and 
quality of accumulated knowledge, driving thinkers to push past the 
existing frontiers of multi-disciplinary and cross-disciplinary spheres of 
intellectual inquiry. For Ibn Khaldūn, two factors may be shown through 
his learning career. The first relates to the mode and nature of his inter-
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disciplinary thinking and scholarly encyclopaedic character. The second 
is found in his knowledge and assimilation of current knowledge and 
literature, as shown for instance in his discussion of the history of 
sciences, crafts, and institutions of learning (Ibn Khaldūn, 1967). 
Through an approach embedded in the pedagogical principles and 
assessment of methods of Islamic education, Ibn Khaldūn demonstrates 
a deep yet rich knowledge in the field through accumulated knowledge. 
This helped him use a variety of exploratory methods to problems and 
cases. His reasoning shows the wearing of different intellectual hats 
so to speak; the ability to thinks as a jurist, theologian, legal theorist, 
Qur’ānic exegete, Sufi and spiritualist, historian, and a scholar of 
‘umrān. These highlighted the limited, or perhaps the failing attempts 
of limiting and as such reducing his thought to specific confines, as is 
the case with Cheddadi who chooses to emphasise instead the role of 
Ibn Khaldūn as a ‘sociologist and historian’ to the exclusion of all else 
(Cheddadi, 2000).
Life and professional experience
Ibn Khaldūn chose to engage in public-civil life before the age of twenty. 
In the year 1370 he left politics, opting for seclusion in an idyllic, calm 
refuge among the people of Banī ‘Ārif in the village of Banī Salamah. At 
this time in his life, his diverse interactions had showed two forms: one 
pointing towards public life and society, while the other pointing towards 
the self through the use of silent dialogue, meditation, introspection, 
thinking, and reflection upon the ideas of the world, events, facts, and 
changing conditions. He contemplated how those phenomena related 
to the signs of human association could be arranged and related to one 
another in such a way they would be comprehended according to the 
patterns which compose the essence of human beings and the nature of 
‘umrān (sunan/ divine laws). 
His public life shows a busy schedule with various functions 
and assignments, especially under Sultan Barqūq of Mamluk Egypt 
over a period of twenty-three years (1382-1406) (Fischel, 1967). His 
public functions included the Protégé of the Sultan, Maghribi Consul, 
Professor in the Madrasah of al-Qamḥiya in 1384, Master of Mālikī 
jurisprudence at the Ẓāhiriyyah Madrasah, Professor of ḥadīth at the 
Sarghitmishiya Madrassah in 1389, Head of Baybars Khanqa, Mālikī 
Chief Qāḍī in 1384, the examiner of complaints under the Merinid 
IBN KHALDŪN’S CRITICAL THINKING/ S. MACHOUCHE & B. BENSAID      211
ruler Abū Salīm in 1359, or his mission to Tamerlane in 1401 CE. Ibn 
Khaldūn’s thinking may be said to have been grounded in diversity and 
as such characterised by active interactions with the public; these have 
contributed significantly to the shaping of his critical thinking.
Physical and social environment
Throughout his many discussions of the nature of human reasoning, 
Ibn Khaldūn gives due attention to the social and physical environment 
together in view of the fact that they both exercise varying degrees of 
influence and perhaps constraint on human characters and perceptions, 
while contributing to the shaping of society’s traditional customs. The 
understanding of this reality, however, did not cause Ibn Khaldūn to 
fall into some sort of absolute determinism that overlooked the position 
of human responsibility in its effort to mend or ameliorate social 
conditions through effective decision-making and planning, adequate 
effort, or efficient methods. 
For Ibn Khaldūn, humans are endowed essentially with the power 
of reasoning and divine guidance, which help them to build society 
(‘umrān basharī), meet their needs, and face constraints and challenges. 
Humans can actively draw on themselves and their communities in 
accordance with the norms of true humanity through the worship of 
God. His convictions led him to criticise some of the then popular 
myths resulting from misunderstanding the impact of the social and 
physical environment on the human being. For him, culture, which 
combines all those influential factors, “is not an independent substance, 
but a property of another substance, which is man. Hence the natural 
character of culture must have been the reference to what is natural to 
man, i.e., to his nature and to what differentiates him from the rest of the 
animal world” (Mahdi, 1957).
Ibn Khaldūn dealt with a number of factors beginning with his 
second prefatory discussion until the fifth. Those factors for instance 
include “the parts of the earth where civilisation is found,” “some 
information about oceans, rivers, and zones,” “the temperate and 
intemperate zones,” “the influence of the air upon the colour of 
human beings and upon many other aspects of their condition,” “the 
influence of the air (climate) upon human character,” and “differences 
with regard to abundance and scarcity of food in the various inhabited 
regions (‘umrān) and how they affect the human body and character.” 
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In examining the physical factors of geographical regions, Ibn Khaldūn 
introduced the term moderation on the account of the moderate quality 
of the physical environment. He concluded that “the inhabitants of the 
middle zones are temperate in their physique and character and in their 
ways of life” (Ibn Khaldūn, 1967, p. 61). 
It was with such an understanding that Ibn Khaldūn rejected some 
unacceptable popular interpretations of abnormal behaviour such as 
levity, excitability, and great emotionalism found generally among 
Africans. According to him, both Abū al-Ḥasan ibn ‘Alī al-Mas‘ūdī 
(d. 956) and Abū Yūsuf Ya‘qūb al-Kindī (d. 873) adopted their views 
from Galen (Claudius Galenus) (d. 217). Al-Mas‘ūdī undertook it upon 
himself to investigate the true reason of emotionalism, whereupon his 
explanation “that the reason is a weakness of their brains which results 
in a weakness of their intellect” is “inconclusive and unproven” (Ibn 
Khaldūn, 1967, p. 64).
The nature of human thinking
Dhaouadi (1997) believes that a substantive proof that Ibn Khaldūn’s 
major perceptions are drawn from Islamic revelation is found in the 
way he defines and approaches human nature. In his Muqaddimah, Ibn 
Khaldūn did not preach what was contrary or opposed to the thoughts, 
meanings, and descriptions of the Qur’ān or ḥadīth on fiṭrah; rather, 
he kept away from the influences of foreign knowledge which had 
tremendous impact on Muslim philosophers like Abū Yūsuf Yaʻqūb ibn 
Isḥāq aṣ-Ṣabbāḥ al-Kindī, Abū Naṣr Muhammad ibn Muhammad al-
Fārābī, Abū ʿAlī al-Ḥusayn ibn ʿAbdullāh ibn al-Ḥasan ibn ‘Alī ibn 
Sīnā, or Abū Ḥāmid Muhammad ibn Muhammad al-Ghazālī.
Human nature represents a significant starting point in Ibn 
Khaldūn’s work and shapes the exercise and direction of his critical 
thinking. The term fiṭrah appears twenty times in the Muqaddimah 
along with other related terms such as human (insānī), and humanity 
(insāniyyah) being mentioned approximately one hundred and 
ninety-eight times (Machouche, 2012). It was the concept of fiṭrah 
that essentially led Ibn Khaldūn to acknowledge human potential, 
undertake upon himself an understanding of their limits, and to perceive 
feelings, reasoning, thinking, and understanding as divine gifts upon 
humans. As a result, the intellect is not viewed as an absolute tool for 
certain knowledge (‘ilm yaqīnī). Ibn Khaldūn uses this statement in 
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his critique of the three branches of knowledge, namely, philosophy, 
theology, and Greek logic.
According to Ibn Khaldūn, critical thinking rests on the perception 
of the innate human nature which Dhaouadi (1997, p. 106) noted “…
have been largely if not completely neglected by those who have 
studied Ibn Khaldūn’s work” as a result of the “prevailing positivist 
spirit of the author’s work.” The reason is found in the beginning of the 
Muqaddimah when Ibn Khaldūn explains the metaphysical origins of 
man and the basis of his nature. He highlights the perfection of human 
nature as per the Qur’ān’s description. Ibn Khaldūn uses fiṭrah to support 
his thoughts, assumptions, explanations, and theories. He believes that 
fiṭrah is the highest creation according to which God endowed humans 
with enormous potential and abilities whether spiritual, emotional, 
cognitive, communicative, or behavioural so as to sustain the purpose 
of creation, namely the worship of God.
Ibn Khaldūn’s dependence on revelation guarded him from all 
possible pitfalls resulting from applications of secular methodologies, 
which intentionally de-spiritualise the nature of man and his experience. 
In Ibn Khaldūn’s treatment of human nature, the reader is replete with 
concepts and rich details on human nature, alongside critical inroads 
into spiritual, psychic, cognitive, intellectual, individual, communal, 
religious, social, economic, educational, and political dimensions. For 
example, one commonly comes across terms such as fiṭrah (human 
predisposition), (thought), tafkīr (thinking), malakah (habit/skill), 
ṣinā‘ah (artefact), jamā‘ah (group/community), ma‘āsh (livelihood), 
tarbiyah (learning and education), and diyānah (religion/religiosity). 
Ibn Khaldūn links those terms and concepts to human nature and uses 
them as a fundamental theoretical framework. Interestingly enough, 
Dhaouadi, among many others, indicates that those technical terms 
served as a methodological tool in Ibn Khaldūn’s research to explain 
the birth, development, and decline of human civilisation (Dhaouadi, 
2008).
Constructs of Ibn Khaldūn’s critical thinking 
It is not a simple matter to define critical thinking according to Ibn 
Khaldūn, particularly if we choose to compare it with contemporary 
scholarship on the subject. However, one may examine the most 
significant constructs of this type of thinking in Ibn Khaldūn’s legacy. 
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Perhaps one of the most important factors we need to appreciate in 
this regard is the impact of revelation on the powerful meanings of 
seminal concepts used throughout work such as lessons (‘ibar), human 
association (‘umrān), social solidarity (‘aṣabiyyah), cause (sabab), 
human nature (fiṭrah), royal authority (mulk),state/dynasty (dawlah), 
religion (millah), nomad (badw), sedentary (ḥaḍar), luxury (taraf), 
a‘rāb, Bedouins/ nomads (ummah), (highly structured community), 
knowledge (‘ilm), and vicegerency (khilāfah). With this, the definition 
of critical thinking according to Ibn Khaldūn should be constructed 
on the basis of consideration given to a few cardinal elements of his 
discourse including revelation (waḥy/shar‘) from which he inferred the 
fundamentals of his worldview, concept, and laws.
Critical thinking according to Ibn Khaldūn has much to do with 
the way one understands the meaning of the divine order and guidance, 
beneficial knowledge, human nature, and its purpose in life. On many 
occasions Ibn Khaldūn describes ‘ilm (knowledge) as ‘malakah’ 
(skill) which must be subject to at least two interrelated processes; the 
acquisition and development through repetition and perfection. Sound 
knowledge refers to facts, authentic reports and statements, substantial 
ideas, and valid acts. ‘Ilm is not static but dynamic. Critical thinking 
is also identified in the way one interprets the process of thinking per 
se. Here we can draw on the different types of reasoning Ibn Khaldūn 
mentions such as discerning reason (‘aql tamyīzī), experiential reason 
(‘aql tajrībī), and acquired reasoning (‘aql mazīd). 
Perhaps the most apt description one may give to critical thinking 
according to Ibn Khaldūn is as a way and level of reasoning based 
on the principles of the Islamic worldview and accumulated Islamic 
knowledge to produce forms of practical understanding. The quality 
of critical thinking is evaluated on the basis of its coherence, clarity, 
creativity, suitability, effectiveness, accuracy, problem solving, and 
social impact. Critical thinking thus forms an interactive relationship 
that links thinking with itself, knowledge, and society as a whole, 
and is viewed as a focused exercise of thought, accommodating and 
open, dynamic, and purposive or directive. The perspective of fiṭrah, 
as Machouche (2012) suggests, leads Ibn Khaldūn to confidently 
criticise some modes of thinking based on different metaphysical 
configurations and worldviews, the Aristotelian logic foremost among 
them.
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Although Ibn Khaldūn acknowledges some intellectual and cognitive 
benefits of logic, he believes that it is not a suitable tool to understand 
the changing and diverse conditions of ‘umrān. Ibn Khaldūn’s critical 
thinking led him to offer natural thinking alternatives based on Tawḥīd-
Fiṭrah-Tawḥīd different from Dhaouadi’s view “the ‘aql-naql mind’ or 
‘the ideal mind” which combines knowledge derived from revelation 
with knowledge from human reasoning (Dhaouadi, 2005). 
Application of Ibn Khaldūn’s critical thinking
Ibn Khaldūn attempts to excel in a number of intellectual disciplines 
drawing from the methods of ‘ilm al-kalām (Islamic scholastic theology), 
philosophy, and Taṣawwuf. This, Cheddadi (2005, p. vol. I, p. xxxiii) 
calls, a disparagingly ‘disappointing beginning’ (bidāyāt khā’ibah). 
The value of critical thinking depends on the nature of intention (qaṣd), 
the reliability and accuracy of verification (taḥqīq/burhān), degree 
of correspondence (muṭābaqah), the strength of evidence (dalīl), and 
implications and consequences (ma‘āl). Correspondence is used as the, 
“criterion of adequacy of the statements to the laws of historical events 
defined by the set of the sciences whose subject matters are derived 
from the new science, is substituted to the adequacy of the events 
themselves” (al-Marzouki, 2003, p. 61). This criterion is set to verify 
the relationship between statements made by researchers, thinkers, 
scholars, or scientists and laws of historical events. There is another 
higher line of verification however, which requires application of the 
same principle with reference to revelation, as Ibn Khaldūn himself did 
in numerous instances throughout his Muqaddimah.
Ibn Khaldūn’s critical thinking encompasses various fields. His 
multifaceted intellectual background provided him with a broad 
perspective for balanced judgments and thought as seen in his account on 
Muslim mystical practices and development in the Muslim world. While 
a number of Muslim scholars avoid negotiating some of its practices, Ibn 
Khaldūn tried hard to accommodate or at least to understand the Sufi’s 
mind and the Sufi’s behaviour in its own context. The Sufis, according to 
him, “have their particular form of behavior and linguistic terminology 
which they use in instruction” (1967, p. 395). For Ibn Khaldūn, this 
does not justify many of the deviated thoughts and practices of Sufi 
orders. He sought to retrace infiltrations of Sufi doctrines and practices. 
Ibn Khaldūn’s perspective provides him with the ability of critiquing 
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Sufism using synchronic and diachronic approaches. The treatment of 
Sufism is appropriate when the time factor is taken into consideration. 
The Sufi legacy needs to be divided into the era of the salaf and the 
muta’akhkhirīn for later periods to prevent anachronistic analysis (Ibn 
Khaldūn, 2005, vol. 5, p. 219).
Moderation and balance are what characterise Ibn Khaldūn’s 
critique of the Sufi-Order. The reason being that Ibn Khaldūn focuses 
on the positive aspects of their mystical experience and the Sufis’ deep 
knowledge of the self while calling on those who acquire it to exercise 
caution in regard to what they intend to communicate and share. In this 
regard, he highlights a number of crucial cognitive conditions and the 
limited nature of humans in their perception of what lies beyond the 
truth, by means of suspicious visualisations, imaginations, perceptions, 
sensations, and accidents.
In the process of applying critical thinking, Ibn Khaldūn chooses 
Islamic revelation as his highest terms of normative reference in regards 
to what is right, true, suitable, or moderate. On some occasions, he 
would quote verses from the Qur’ān or ḥadīth while on others he would 
simply draw indirect inferences. For instance, in order to mark the type 
of authentic Sufism, Ibn Khaldūn proposes self-purification as a way to 
the truth and guidance introduced in the early periods of Muslim history.
The best example showcasing Ibn Khaldūn’s thinking exercises may 
be found in the introduction of the Muqaddimah where he questions 
the very epistemological foundations of historiography and philosophy 
of history. The selection of these two branches of knowledge is 
significant in view of their critical position in the making of the edifice 
of knowledge (‘umrān al-ma‘rifah) and the civilisation at that time. As 
indicated, Ibn Khaldūn perceives history as news and information on 
human association with both its achievements and failures. Historical 
knowledge according to Ibn Khaldūn deals with all conditions that 
the states of human association, civilisation, or culture (al-‘umrān 
al-basharī) “…savagery [tawaḥḥush] and sociability, group feelings, 
and the different ways by which one group of human beings achieves 
superiority over another. It deals with royal authority and the dynasties 
that result (in this manner) and with the various ranks that exist within 
them. It further deals with the different kinds of gainful occupations 
and ways of making a living, with the sciences and crafts that human 
beings pursue as part of their activities and efforts, and with all the other 
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institutions that originate in civilisation through its very nature” (Ibn 
Khaldūn, 1967, p. 35). For Ibn Khaldūn, history is a discipline with two 
levels: The appearing surface which contains the reporting news (al-
akhbār) and the deep (a‘maq) which deals with the inner meaning that 
involves speculation and attempt to explain the happenings in human 
association according to their real causes (Ibn Khaldūn, 1967, p. 5).
Interestingly enough, the technical language Ibn Khaldūn has 
used to discuss or criticise numerous shortcomings of historians’ 
old methods reveals his deep knowledge of the field. He speaks for 
instance about the inner meaning of history, speculation, verification, 
subtle explanation of causes, realisation of facts, and profound causes. 
In contrast, he uses negative technical terminology to describe the 
shortcomings of traditional historical methods and models such as the 
collection of apocryphal and untrue gossip, inventions, false statements, 
discredited reports, inattention to causes, nonsensical stories, error, poor 
revision, weak assumptions, blind trust, mere dictation, and imitation 
(Ibn Khaldūn, 1967). He also criticises the styles of later Muslim 
writings whose authors exaggerated the narrowing down of the content 
of historiography to the extent that it reports only events related to 
kings and rulers as found in the work of Ibn Rashīq’s Mīzān al-‘Amal 
(Criterion of Action). He also made a visible reference to names and 
works of some outstanding Muslim historians like Ibn Isḥāq, al-Ṭabarī, 
Ibn al-Kalbī, al-Wāqidī, al-Azdī, and al-Mas‘ūdī setting them all on an 
equal footing (Fischel, 1967).
The most significant axiomatic and methodological rule of 
Ibn Khaldūn which may better illustrate his critical thinking is his 
‘verification of narration against the laws of ‘umrān’. He comments: 
“Civilisation [‘umrān], in its (different) conditions, contains (different) 
elements to which historical information may be related and with which 
reports and historical materials may be checked” (1967, p. 6). He 
identifies factors that weaken the scientific aspects of the methodology 
adopted by most poor historians (maghālīṭ al-mu’arrikhīn) before and 
during his time. Those factors include disregard of changes in conditions 
and in the customs of nations and races that the passing of time brings 
about, partisanship for opinions and schools, reliance upon transmitters, 
unawareness of the purpose of an event, unfounded assumptions as to the 
truth of a matter, ignorance of how conditions conform with reality, and 
people’s approach towards great and high-ranking persons with praise 
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and encomiums, and making untruth unavoidable. More detrimental 
than all previously mentioned reasons is the ignorance of the nature of 
the various conditions arising in civilisation (Ibn Khaldūn, 1967). 
Furthermore, Ibn Khaldūn sets out to shun some of the 
epistemological and methodological dilemmas in history and to request 
historians to meet necessary pre-requisites which include a working 
knowledge of the principles of politics, the true nature of existent things, 
and the differences among nations, places, and periods with regard to 
ways of life, character qualities, customs, sects, and schools. He equally 
emphasises the need for acquiring comprehensive knowledge of present 
conditions in all these respects, using comparative methods whether 
synchronic and diachronic, knowledge of the origin and development 
of dynasties and religious groups, cause of events, knowledge of 
reporters, and the verification of transmitted information using the 
basic principles he is aware of. In a very descriptive prose, Ibn Khaldūn 
exposed his critical approach, particularly in the field of history. He 
highlights the use of a number of critical thinking processes such as 
making corrections, convergence, proposing alternative methods of 
arrangement and classification, introducing original thoughts and ideas, 
explanation, and avoiding imitation.
One of the significant critical moves Ibn Khaldūn made was 
regarding the performance and impact of dialectic theology on Muslim 
society. He emphasises the limited nature of human cognitive abilities 
and the societal outcomes of theoretical Islamic theology which he 
defined as, “a science that involves arguing with logical proofs [adillah 
‘aqliyyah] in defense of the articles of faith and refuting innovators who 
deviate in their dogmas from early Muslims and Muslim orthodoxy” (Ibn 
Khaldūn, 2005, vol. 5, p. 348). In order to develop a critical approach to 
this discipline, Ibn Khaldūn uses a number of key terms mostly around 
Tawḥīd (The Unity of God), reasoning, evident natural causes, worship, 
states, perception, facts, established habits and customs, and happiness. 
Ibn Khaldūn believes that intellectual reasoning as a way to defend 
Muslim beliefs is not the ideal method because of its constraints and 
limitations. The world of faith is far beyond the world of perception. 
For him, one of the meanings of Tawḥīd is to omit series of material 
causes to justify the articles of belief. Ibn Khaldūn (2005, vol. 5, p. 
351) said, “Thus, (recognition of the) oneness of God is identical with 
an inability to perceive the causes and the ways in which they exercise 
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their influence, and with reliance in this respect upon the Creator of 
the causes who comprises them.” We see at this stage his rejection 
of the utility of ‘ilm al-kalām and a criticism of some of its primary 
epistemological foundations which essentially rest on the capacity for 
intellectual reasoning.
Ibn Khaldūn then proceeds further to assess the implications of 
theology for individuals and community society in general. To move 
towards this stage of criticism, he operates the key term ‘al-ḥāl’ 
(state or attribute), referring to what lays beyond mere knowledge or 
speech. He argues that realisation of true Tawḥīd needs to be preceded 
by a realisation of aḥwāl, and not necessarily through obtaining its 
knowledge or uttering its words alone. Ibn Khaldūn Ibn Khaldūn (2005, 
vol. 5, p. 352) says, “The original knowledge (‘ilm) which was devoid 
of being an attribute is of little advantage or use.” Another key term Ibn 
Khaldūn uses is happiness, which he defines as fruit of the, “acquisition 
of a habit firmly rooted in the soul, from which a necessary knowledge 
results for the soul.” In his conclusion, Ibn Khaldūn showed some of 
the basis of his critique of Muslim theology. These include the principle 
of necessity, function, availability of better alternatives, and allowing 
certain exceptions in other (Ibn Khaldūn, 2005, vol. 5, pp. 353-354). 
Another example of Ibn Khaldūn’s critical thinking is showcased 
in his refutation of philosophy and his purposeful limiting of the 
scope and function of Aristotelian logic. For him, sciences are never 
neutral bodies of knowledge for they carry with them the colours of 
the very civilisations that discovered, invented, and developed them. 
The development of sciences is also affected by the general conditions, 
particularly the social and political phenomenon of civilisation (Al-Rabe, 
1984). Some sciences succeed to cross their native geographical borders 
because of their benefits and strengths of theoretical foundations, facts, 
and thoughts. Learning and transmission of those sciences create in Ibn 
Khaldūn’s view, sites of learning and knowledge (aswāq al-‘ulūm), or 
from a more contemporary bent, a ‘knowledge economy’ which are 
included in what is known as science of the ancients (‘ulūm al-awwalīn/
al-mutaqaddimīn’).
The central theme in Ibn Khaldūn’s criticism of philosophy lies 
in his definition of reason/intellect, functions, scope and limitations 
of philosophical knowledge, validity, and practical impact on society. 
Although many have underscored the influence of Ghazālī’s Tahāfut al-
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Falāsifah (Incoherence of the Philosophers) on Ibn Khaldūn as a whole 
(al-Rabe, 1984), the character of his thought may be well detected in 
his intellectual approach, especially in his doubts and scepticism in 
the potential of philosophy to guide people to happiness without the 
assistance of revelation. For him, the detriment of philosophy to religion 
may be great. This begins with the philosophers’ claim (qawman min 
‘uqalā’ al-naw’ al-basharī) who argue that “…the essence and conditions 
of the whole existence, both the part of it perceivable by the senses and 
that beyond sensual perception, as well as the reasons and the causes of 
(those essences and conditions), can be perceived by mental speculation 
and not through tradition because they belong among the intellectual 
perception” (Ibn Khaldūn, 1967, p. 398).
For Ibn Khaldūn, logic is the tool used by philosophers to 
distinguish truth from falsehood. The process through which 
judgments are abstracted according to the norm (qānūn) involves 
three abstractions: an abstraction from individual forms or pictures, 
an abstraction from universal ideas, and an abstraction from simple 
universal ideas (Ibn Khaldūn, 1967, p. 399.). At this level, Ibn 
Khaldūn indirectly questions how simple universal ideas are related 
to the individual. He (1967) concludes the following, “…in the books 
of the logicians, one finds a statement to the effect that perception 
has precedence and that apperception depends upon it. This statement 
must be understood in the sense of (arriving at) consciousness and not 
in the sense of (achieving) complete knowledge” (Ibn Khaldūn, 1967, 
p. 399).
Following the sphere of cognition, Ibn Khaldūn criticises the 
philosophical concept of achieving happiness (Korkut, 2008) which 
according to philosophers consists of arriving at a perception of all 
existing things, both the sensibilia and the (things) beyond sensual 
perception, with the help of (rational) speculation and argumentation 
(Ibn Khaldūn, 1967). Again, Ibn Khaldūn explains some of the 
fundamentals which philosophers use to make such claims, including 
observation of lower substance, consciousness of the existence of the 
soul, and the power of the soul generating awareness of the dominant 
position of the intellect. Ibn Khaldūn’s issue in this context concerns 
the limitations of  the cognitive and epistemological tools (intellect 
and abstraction) that philosophers use in their pursuit for certainty in 
moral values.
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Using a direct yet rigorous language, Ibn Khaldūn (1967) criticised 
the arguments that philosophers use. For example, he says, “it should 
be known that the (opinion) the (philosophers) hold is wrong in all of 
its aspects,” or “The arguments that (the philosophers) parade for their 
claims regarding the existentia and that they offer to the test of the 
norms of logic, are insufficient for the purpose” (Ibn Khaldūn, 1967, 
p. 401), or “The (philosophers) say that happiness consists in coming 
to perceive existence as it is, by means of (logical) arguments. This is 
a fraudulent statement that must be rejected” (Ibn Khaldūn, 1967, p. 
402). In view of the pitfalls of philosophy in its search for happiness, 
Ibn Khaldūn not only sees it as a wrong avenue, but also believes that its 
sources are impediments to real happiness (Ibn Khaldūn, 1967, p. 403). 
Nevertheless, Ibn Khaldūn does not ignore or deny the advantages 
of philosophy. His critique of the knowledge of philosophy is much 
catered to the claims of philosophers. He acknowledges the benefits 
of philosophy and its sharpening of the minds through the order of 
presentation of proofs and arguments, and its importance in developing 
the habit of excellence and proper argumentation and building of solid 
methods. However, the learning of philosophy requires students to be 
fully cautious of its pernicious aspects. Students of philosophy must 
study philosophy after proper saturation with the religious law and study 
of the interpretation of the Qur’ān and jurisprudence (Ibn Khaldūn, 
1967). Ibn Khaldūn’s criticism is thus directed with attention to religious 
and social welfare. When social welfare is at stake, the current set of 
thinking needs to be re-evaluated and criticised irrespective of the stage 
of development, whether it is Sufism, theology, philosophy, or logic.
The reference of al-‘umrān al-basharī
Exploration of the laws of human association and development require 
higher sources of knowledge (revelation), high and low intermediary 
sciences (‘ulūm), and medium-sciences (‘ulūm ‘āliyah). According to 
Mahdi, philosophy is by far the most dominant medium in Ibn Khaldūn’s 
scientific thought (Mahdi, 1957). Mahdi supports this using a number of 
arguments relating to Ibn Khaldūn’s perception of history, classification 
of knowledge (Mahdi, 1957), meta-methodology, and ground and scope 
of the ‘umrān sciences, not to forget his methodological procedures. To 
address those issues in a different track of analysis however, we need 
to re-position the factor of philosophy and give due consideration to 
the evidences of the revelation which cannot be ignored as far as Ibn 
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Khaldūn’s early education and career are concerned. The survey and 
categorisation of the Muqaddimah point to a discussion of philosophy 
and revelation as evidently present in the first few pages of his 
introduction. 
The active presence of revelation in the Muqaddimah cannot be 
superficial, for it is revelation that built Ibn Khaldūn’s distinctive yet 
diverse thought and played multiple roles in making Ibn Khaldūn’s 
thought. Revelation is taken as the absolute reference for truth and 
certainty, a comprehensive worldview, a psycho-spiritual ground of 
motivation, a source of law and patterns of change (sunan) pertaining to 
human association, a spring of perception for understanding the nature 
of both man and society, a source of technical language and meanings, 
and a series of basic fundamentals necessary for the process of knowing 
(human cognitive and intellectual abilities and limitations). Not limited 
to this, it extends itself as a source of understanding the general order 
of the physical world and beyond. It provids man with a comprehensive 
perception and requirements for beneficial knowledge, and guiding 
principles leading effectively towards developing effective patronage, 
generating knowledge, and using its products for the betterment of 
society and ethics.
The laws and patterns of the ‘umrān represent just one among many 
other references Ibn Khaldūn uses to verify the validity of statements, 
data, and opinions. According to Ibn Khaldūn, in the establishment of 
the truth and sound judgments regarding the states of the ‘umrān and 
its happenings, one needs to consider the ratio of conformity existing 
between reported information and what actually has occurred or would 
occur in reality. This exercise needs a measure of personal criticism and 
checking against external evidences (Ibn Khaldūn, 1967, p. 38).
On sixteen occasions in his Muqaddimah, and to highlight the 
principle of conformity, Ibn Khaldūn uses different descriptive 
determinants including self-conformity, conformity by way of questions-
answers, conformity of wisdom and society, perceptual conformity, 
conformity of the defined with the definition, comprehensive conformity, 
and conformity of the state. The course of this principle is often reduced 
to the relationship between the facts referred to as the order of the 
creation and the claimed statement/reported narrations. The higher 
source of the knowledge of the revelation is often oversight in defining 
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the direction of conformity. The Muqaddimah did not fail to refer to the 
premier conformity within the divine law, objectives of the divine law, 
scholarly consensus, rules and rulings of the divine law, legal logic, 
decrees of divine law, Islamic law and jurisprudence, legal evidences, 
religion, legal truth, beliefs, legal texts, clear legal texts, Islamic legal 
sciences, scholars of legal sciences, method of legal narrations, and 
religious practices. The conformity relationship is described either as 
a textual cause, natural cause(s), universal/popular, sufficient, valid, 
natural, hidden, the cause of causes, objective, and Allah’s wisdom. 
Thus, one may conclude that Ibn Khaldūn’s critical thinking through its 
‘umrānī outlook operates according to three independent yet concordant 
references, namely, revelation, knowledge, and social experience. 
Those references are inter-related by the criterion conformity which 
help scholars to make their judgments and evaluate the credibility of 
ideas and actions.
Characteristics of Ibn Khaldūn’s critical thinking
The basis of Ibn Khaldūn’s critical thinking draws on revelation as 
ultimate term of reference, faith, intellect, body of knowledge, and 
problematic subjects. Agil (2008) believes that the Khaldūnian mind 
has not only reconciled reason and religion, but has further proven the 
compatibility of science and religion with the application of the scientific 
method in the understanding of social phenomena with the Qur’ānic 
conception of history, establishing the structure of the Khaldūnian 
mind. Critical thinking in the light of Ibn Khaldūn’s experience is one 
whole activity having different constructive features that can be placed 
according to the following seven segments: 
i. ‘objectives’ as found in introducing alternatives, seeking and 
preserving the truth, resisting falsehood and its implications for 
the society, and the making of scientific knowledge; 
ii. method which entails identifying correspondence, comparison, 
contrast, explanation, verification, review, illustration, 
classification, organisation, and raising genuine questions 
(tahdhīb, taqrīb, taḥqīq, muṭābaqah, muqāranah); 
iii. operative laws, encompassing revelation, laws of ‘umrān, 
customs, innate human nature, and sound and natural reasoning; 
iv. applied knowledge involving the review and assimilation of 
existing knowledge with effective access to primary sources; 
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v. core skills, comprising personal, scientific, linguistic, 
professional, and social uses of the high sources of knowledge 
(revelation), the integration of knowledge, developing 
constructive questions and approaches, investigation, positive 
thinking, observation, using rich, fine, precise and succinct 
language; 
vi. values inherent in championing the truth, inclusiveness, 
creativity, seeking the common good, rejection of sectarianism, 
adherence to moderation, humbleness, and acknowledging the 
merits of other scholars; 
vii. achievement, as embodied in the discovery and development of 
new science (‘ilm al-‘umrān).
The operational components of Ibn Khaldūn’s critical thinking, however, 
include alternatives, criteria, information input and output, preference, 
and objectives. The highest positive values are thus measured according 
to the criteria of truth and validity, public welfare, and virtue. Those 
criteria, however, are subject to revelation. Ibn Khaldūn’s model of 
critical thinking is a multi-levelled, multi-purpose, multi-dimensional, 
hierarchical, and ‘revelation-based’ thinking. Using this generic base of 
critical thinking, Ibn Khaldūn was able to express with clarity genuine 
Islamic thinking without falling into its alien forms strange to the 
fundamentals of his own Islamic worldview.
The reliance of Ibn Khaldūn’s critical thinking on universal sources 
such as the revelation, fiṭrah (human nature), and the laws of ‘umrān 
places it on a significantly universal scale. This may be illustrated in 
at least two different ways; reliance on examining the relevance of Ibn 
Khaldūn’s thought to today’s scholarship and life in general. Some 
researchers, Arabs and non-Arabs alike, have adopted few approaches 
to look into this relevance by way of comparison and contrast with 
Western scholars, while others, like Farid Alatas, suggest a more serious 
approach in their urging of researchers to incorporate Ibn Khaldūn 
into modern social sciences and develop a “systematic Khaldūnian 
sociology” (Alatas, 2006a, pp. 402-407). The second group, however, 
looks at the extension and influence of Ibn Khaldūn’s thought on foreign 
scholarship, which according to Alatas (2006b) probably began with 
Gumplowicz’s publication of a part of al-Muqaddimah in Soziologische 
Essays in 1899 [French translation of Muqaddimah by Silvestre de Sacy 
1810].
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There is a strong consensus among researchers that Ibn Khaldūn’s 
intellectual legacy is a living thought in need of more attention. 
Irrespective of the excess of one thousand six hundred works that have 
been published on him so far, researches still consciously examine and 
study his works. One can confidently argue that truly significant issues 
have yet to be discussed in Ibn Khaldūn’s thought due to the quasi-
monopoly and dominant positivists, secularists and their attendants 
following their worldview, methodology, epistemology and values that 
have been exerted in the last two hundred years. The question of critical 
thinking still challenges the current dominant Western paradigm of 
human knowledge which suffers from a serious crises in regards to issues 
of the truth, values, and objectives of human life. Dhaouadi was correct 
when he asserted that Ibn Khaldūn’s high intellectual pioneering of 
‘umrān (social sciences) raises serious questions about the assumptions 
of the modern Western mind’s persistent claims that true science and 
authentic knowledge cannot be obtained if religion and science are not 
kept separate from one another (Dhaouadi, 2005). Ibn Khaldūn raised 
serious questions about knowledge and learning in general, nature of 
man, purpose and wisdom of life, functions of institutions, position of 
religion, wealth, and civilisations that have all yet to be answered today 
by means of the secular human and social science. 
Conclusion
Ibn Khaldūn’s critical thinking may best be described as an ‘umrānī critical 
thinking in view of the fact that some have described his entire thinking 
as ‘umrānī’, as was the case with Dhaouadi (2005). His contributions 
to the field of critical thinking was the result of his intellectual efforts 
and method of exploring the world of human knowledge and life. His 
contributions lay in his attempt to revive sound methods of thinking and 
understanding of human beings, either as individuals or communities in 
various branches of knowledge. Such an attempt was founded on three 
sources of knowledge, namely revelation, human experience and the 
study of society, and the impact of the physical environment.
The constructive critical thinking of Ibn Khaldūn is built on various 
evidences inferred from many sources which provide satisfactory 
explanations and reflect a good understanding of the causes and 
nature of things. The complexity of critical thinking, however, 
depends on the equal complexity of its domain and consequence on 
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human organisation (‘umrān). Thus, critical thinking according to the 
Khaldūnian experience is nothing less than a form of holistic thinking 
which strongly relates to the well-being of society rather than the 
building of abstract or complex edifices of human thoughts and ideas. 
Critical thinking accordingly does not necessarily represent any new 
mode of thinking but demonstrates its efficiency through the theoretical 
and practical solutions it provides to real challenges. Ibn Khaldūn’s 
critical thinking brought an intellectual revolution. The relevance of 
his critical thinking is still felt in our time.
References:
Agil, S. O. (2008). The muqaddimah of Ibn Khaldūn: Religion, human nature 
and economics. Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia: Selangor International Islamic 
College (KUIS).
Alatas, S. (2006a). A Khaldunian exemplar for a historical sociology for the 
South. Current Sociology, 54(3), 397-411.
Alatas, A. (2006b). Ibn Khaldun and contemporary sociology. International 
Sociology, 21(6), 782-795.
Al-Ḥuṣrī, S. (1967). Dirāsāt ‘an Muqaddimat Ibn Khaldūn. Cairo: Maktabat 
al-Khanjī. 
Al-Marzouki, A. (2003). Ibn Khaldun’s epistemological and axiological 
paradoxes. In Ahmed Ibrahim Abushouk (Ed.), Ibn Khaldun and Muslim 
historiography (pp. 47-82). Kuala Lumpur: International Islamic 
University Malaysia.
Al-Rabe, A. A. (1948). Muslim philosophers classification of sciences: 
Al-Kindī, al-Fārābī, al-Ghazālī, Ibn Khaldūn (Ph.D thesis). Harvard 
University, USA
Ardıẓ, N. (2008). Beyond science as a vocation: Civilisational epistemology 
in Ibn Khaldun and Weber. Asian Journal of Social Science, 36, 434-464.
Ayad, M. K. (1930). Die geschichts- und gesellschaftslehre Ibn Ḫaldūns. 
Berlin, Cotta.
Baali F., & Wardī, ‘A. (1981). Ibn Khaldun and Islamic thought-styles: A social 
perspective. Boston, Massachusetts: G. K. Hall and Co. 
Baali F. (1988). Society, state, and urbanism: Ibn Khaldun’s sociological 
thought. Albany: State University of New York Press.
Cheddadi, A. (2000). Ibn Khaldun. The Quarterly Review of Comparative 
Education, xxiv(1/2), 7-19.
IBN KHALDŪN’S CRITICAL THINKING/ S. MACHOUCHE & B. BENSAID      227
Cheddadi, A. (Ed.). (2005). Al-muqaddimah. Morocco: Dār al-Funūn wa-al-
‘Ulūm wa-al-Ādāb. 
Dale, S. F. (2006). Ibn Khaldūn: The last Greek and the first annaliste historian. 
International Journal of Middle East Studies, 38(03), 431-451.
Dhaouadi, M. (1997). New explorations into the making of Ibn Khladun’s 
umran mind. Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia: A.S. Noordeen.
Dhaouadi, M. (2005). The Ibar: Lessons of Ibn Khaldūn’s ‘umrān mind. 
Contemporary Sociology, 34(6), 585-591. 
Dhaouadi, M. (2008). The forgotten concept of human nature in Khaldunian 
studies. Asian Journal of Social Science, 36(3-4), 571-589.
Fischel, W. J. (1967). Ibn Khaldūn in Egypt: His public functions his and 
historical research, 1382-1406; A study in Islamic Historiography. 
Berkeley, USA: University of California Press.
Gibb, H. A. R. (1933). The Islamic Background of Ibn Khaldūn’s political 
theory. Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies, 7(01), 23-
31.
Goodman, L. E. (1972). Ibn Khaldūn and Thucydides. Journal of American 
Oriental Society, 2, 250-270. 
Halpern, D, F. (1996). Thought and knowledge: An introduction to critical 
thinking (3rd ed.). NJ, USA: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.
Husayn, T. (1925). Falsafat Ibn Khaldūn al-ijtimā‘iyyah: Naqd wa-taḥlīl 
(Muhammad Abdullah ‘Inan, Trans.). Cairo: Maṭba‘at al-I‘timād.
Ibn Khaldūn. A. (1967). The muqaddimah (F. Rosenthal, Trans., N. J. Dawood, 
Ed.). London, Bollingen Series, Princeton University Press.
Ibn Khaldūn. A. (2005). Al-muqaddimah (Cheddadi, A., Ed.). Morocco: Dār 
al-Funūn wa-al-‘Ulūm wa-al-Ādāb.
Irwin, R. (1997). Toynbee and Ibn Khaldun. Middle Eastern Studies Journal, 
33(3), 461-479. 
Korkut, S. (2008). Ibn Khaldūn’s critique of the theory of al-siyasah al-
madaniyyah. Asian Journal of Social Science, 36, 557-564. 
Machouche, S. B. (2012). ‘Ilm al-‘umrān al-Khaldūnī wa-athar al-ru’yah al-
kawniyyah al-Tawḥīdiyyah fī-ṣiyāghatih: Dirāsah taḥlīliyyah lil-insān wa-
al-ma‘rifah ‘inda Ibn Khaldūn. Herndon, USA: International Institute of 
Islamic Thought. 
Mahdi, M. (1957). Ibn Khaldūn’s philosophy of history. USA: The University 
of Chicago Press. 
Nassar, N. (1967). La pensée réaliste d’Ibn Khaldûn. Paris: Presse Universitaire 
de France. 
228                         Intellectual Discourse, Vol 23, No 2, 2015
Simon, H. A., & Kaplan, C. A. (1989). Foundations of cognitive science. In M. 
I. Posner, (Ed.), Foundations of cognitive science (pp. 1-47). Cambridge, 
Mass: The MIT Press.
Solihu, A. K. H. (2010-2011). The quest for unknown: On al-Ghazālī’s critical 
thinking and epistemology in Islamic Tradition, Al-Fikr, Journal of Arabic 
and Islamic Studies, 23-24, 97-114.
Stall, N. N., & Stahl, R. J. (1991). We can agree after all: Achieving a consensus 
for a critical thinking component of a gifted program using the Delphi 
technique. Roeper Review, 14(2), 79-88.
Wardī, ‘A. (1994), Manṭiq Ibn Khaldūn fī ḍaw’ ḥaḍāratihi wa-shakhṣiyyatihi 
(2nd ed.). London: Kufaan Publishing.
